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‘Dear father prior of the monastery of San Esteban in the city of Salamanca’, wrote the Holy 
Roman Emperor Charles V in November 1539, ‘I have been informed that certain religious 
masters of your house have debated and treated in their sermons and lectures the right we 
have over the Indies, the islands and firm lands in the oceanic sea.’1 One very prominent 
member of the Dominican convent, whom Charles V had in mind when he composed this 
letter, was Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546).2 Earlier in the same year, the prime chair in 
theology at the University of Salamanca had delivered his famous relectio De indis. In this 
solemn lecture, addressed to an illustrious audience of intellectuals, he engaged in the 
controversy about the ‘barbarians in the New World, commonly called Indians, who came 
under the power of the Spaniards some forty years ago, having been previously unknown to 
our world’.3 
The attitudes to the Spanish conquest that Vitoria and his colleagues at Salamanca put 
forward have recently been subject to radically contrasting interpretations by historians of 
political thought and scholars associated with post-colonial studies, respectively. If we follow 																																																								
* I would like to extend special thanks to Annabel Brett, for her invaluable feedback and guidance throughout 
the various stages of this article. I am also indebted to the journal’s anonymous referees and to the audience of 
the Jahrestagung der Basel Graduate School of History, where an earlier version of the argument was presented 
in German. The research for this article began during my master’s in Cambridge and has extended into my 
doctoral studies at the same place, and I am grateful for the support of the Jubiläumsstiftung der 
Basellandschaftlichen Kantonalbank and the Cambridge Commonwealth, European & International Trust, 
respectively. In the text that follows, all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
 
1 The letter by Emperor Charles V is edited as ‘Carta al prior de San Esteban, Madrid, 10 de noviembre 1539’, 
in El maestro fray Francisco de Vitoria: su vida, su doctrina e influencia, by Luis G. Alonso Getino (Madrid, 
1930), p. 150: ‘Venerable padre prior del monasterio de santisteban de la cibdat de salamanca yo he sydo 
ynformado que algunos maestros religiosos de esa casa han puesto en platica y tratado en sus sermones y en 
repeticiones del derecho que nos tenemos a las yndias yslas e tierra firme del mar oceano’. 
2 Belda Plans points out that Vitoria resided permanently in the Domincan convent of San Esteban during his 
time at Salamanca. See Juan Belda Plans, La escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo 
XVI (Madrid, 2000), p. 326. Biographical information on the neo-scholastic theologians is, unless otherwise 
indicated, from Jacob Schmutz’s excellent website Scholasticon, http://www.scholasticon.fr (accessed January 
5, 2018). 
3 Francisco de Vitoria, De indis, in Vitoria: political writings, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy 
Lawrance (Cambridge, 1991), p. 233. 
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the latter, the Spanish theologians provided sophisticated vindications of Charles V’s 
imperial cause, whereas, according to the former, they exposed instead that the emperor’s 
venture overseas lacked a thorough foundation in justice.4 This article, however, tries to move 
beyond the apparently irreconcilable impasse that these clashing approaches might seem to 
constitute, by importing a post-colonial perspective into the toolbox of the intellectual 
historian. It suggests taking seriously the thrust of critical scholarship, while simultaneously 
making a case for assessing the language of the Salmantine theologians in its own terms and 
context. The result will be an alternative, novel lens through which to view contemporary 
responses to the shattering episode in world history that we know as the ‘affair of the Indies’. 
The sixteenth-century Spanish theologians, generally known as the ‘School of 
Salamanca’ or ‘second scholastic’, wrote extensive academic lectures and treatises on 
questions of justice and right first articulated in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. 
Alongside an array of sources ranging from Roman law to the medieval canon law tradition,	
they re-interpreted Aquinas’s text in light of the theological, social, and political concerns of 
their time. Upon Charles’s election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519 and the expansion of 
Spain’s composite empire, a whole range of issues regarding political authority became 
central to their thought and literary production. Ever since James Brown Scott’s recovery of 
Vitoria’s lecture on the American Indians in the early twentieth century, it is one specific 
political context which has remained a most prominent focus of historical scholarship on the 
second scholastic: the Spanish conquest of the New World.5 In what is arguably the most 
well-known study on this subject, Anthony Pagden showed that Vitoria, in particular, 
repudiated the idea that the Amerindians could be justly dispossessed and dominated by the 
Spaniards because they were Aristotle’s ‘slaves by nature’.6 It does not therefore come as a 																																																								
4 For a recent intellectual history perspective, see e.g. Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, 
1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2014), ch. 2. The most well-known post-colonial reading is Antony Anghie’s 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of international law (Cambridge, 2004), ch. 1. We shall return to both 
these studies. 
5 James Brown Scott, The Spanish origins of international law: Francisco de Vitoria and his law of nations 
(Oxford, 1934). See also Luciano Vicente Pereña, Misión de España en América: 1540-1560 (Madrid, 1956); 
Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: a study in race prejudice in the modern world (Bloomington, 
IN, 1959); Bernice Hamilton, Political thought in sixteenth-century Spain: a study of the political ideas of 
Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina (Oxford, 1963); Jaime Brufau Prats, La escuela de Salamanca ante el 
descubrimiento del nuevo mundo (Salamanca, 1989). Notable exceptions are Quentin Skinner, who has situated 
the thought of the School of Salamanca in the context of the intellectual battles the neo-scholastics fought with 
humanists and Lutherans in post-Reformation Europe, and Annabel Brett, in her first monograph, which focuses 
on the neo-scholastic theorization of individual rights. See Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political 
thought, (2vosl., Cambridge, 1978), II, pp. 135-73; and Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, right and nature: individual 
rights in later scholastic thought (Cambridge, 1997), ch. 4. 
6 Anthony Pagden, The fall of natural man: the American Indian and the origins of comparative ethnology, 2nd 
rev. ed. (Cambridge, 1986), chs. 2-4. As Brian Tierney has shown, however, the Salmantine theologians 
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surprise that the emperor was far from content with Vitoria’s critical appraisal of the 
conquest. In the final passage of the above-mentioned letter, Charles V ordered that the 
Dominican professors ‘neither now nor at any other time address, preach, or dispute about 
this issue again, and that they neither publish anything in writing relating to this matter 
without the express license of us’.7 
But can the Salmantine university theologians really be said to have seriously 
challenged the legitimacy of Spain’s possessions in the Americas? Recent studies from the 
discipline of intellectual history indeed suggest just this. In the wake of a growing interest in 
the legacy of the ideological foundations both of constructions and deconstructions of 
European imperial claims, the School of Salamanca has become the subject of histories of 
‘empire’. Focusing on the neo-scholastic engagement with the ideology, history, and legal 
foundations of Roman imperium, intellectual historians have shown that almost all the 
Salmantine professors repudiated the notion that Charles V could licitly claim authority over 
the Indies with recourse to his title as Roman emperor.8 But it is well worth remembering that 
the scholastics were not just academic lecturers and teachers, and equally served as 
ecclesiastical and political advisors to the highest Castilian authorities. This is true even for 
Vitoria, whose undeniable tensions with the emperor we have already encountered. But 
Vitoria nevertheless enjoyed the ‘great admiration’ of Charles V, who once paid a personal 
visit to one of Vitoria’s classes and later envisaged him to be among his ambassadors at the 
Council of Trent (1545-63).9  How, then, are we to think of the relationship between 
Salamanca and the Spanish empire? In what follows, this article shifts our attention away 
from an exclusively Roman understanding of empire towards the ius praedicandi, the right to 
preach the gospel. Although the ius praedicandi has been sorely neglected in modern 
historiography, it constituted a central locus for engagements of the School of Salamanca 
with the conquest. It negotiated an uneasy and ambiguous interface between nature and the 
Christian faith, and the ultimate effect of accepting the validity and force of this right, I will 
																																																																																																																																																																												
redefined rather than outrightly rejected the Aristotelian natural slavery theory. See Brian Tierney, ‘Aristotle 
and the American Indians – again: two critical discussions’, Cristianesimo nella storia, 12 (1991), pp. 311-15; 
and Tierny, The idea of natural rights: studies on natural rights, natural law, and church law, 1150-1625 
(Atlanta, 1997), p. 270. 
7 Emperor Charles V, ‘Carta al prior de San Esteban’, p. 151: ‘mandarles [i.e., the religious masters] eys de 
nuestra parte y vuestra que agora ni en tiempo alguno sin espresa licencia nuestra no traten ni prediquen ni 
disputen de lo suso dicho ni hagan ymprimir escriptura alguna tocante a ello’. 
8 A discussion of the respective studies follows below in Section One. 
9 Vitoria’s failing health, however, required him to remain in Salamanca. See Belda Plans, La escuela de 
Salamanca, pp. 331-2. 
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argue, was not only a justification of the Spanish presence in the New World, but also of 
Charles V’s imperial venture. 
 
I 
In recent histories of ‘empire’, it is particularly the Dominican scholastic that has become the 
centre of inquiry, for the writings of its most well-known exponents, Francisco de Vitoria and 
Domingo de Soto (1495-1560), were in important ways responses to the Charles V’s pursuit 
of empire in the Indies. Scholars have shown that classical Rome provided a decisive 
reference point in Spanish scholastic evaluations of the conquest of America from two related 
but ultimately distinct perspectives. The first is what we might call the ‘ideology of Rome’ 
and centred on the question of how the Roman imperial tradition might or might not grant the 
Spaniards rights over Amerindian lands and peoples. Francisco de Vitoria’s answer was 
ambiguous.10 In his discussion of the potential justifications of Castilian domination overseas 
in De indis, Vitoria explained that a licit ‘title may arise whenever the barbarians themselves 
are engaged in legitimate war with one another ... and may call upon the Spaniards to help 
them, and then share the prizes of victory with them’.11 As allies and friends, the Spaniards 
could have joined forces with a native commonwealth, supporting its belligerent undertaking 
against another, hostile Amerindian city. That it was an explicitly Roman notion that 
underlay this example was apparent for Vitoria. ‘The confirmation of this’, he argued, ‘is 
provided by the Romans, who extended their empire in just this way ... thereby taking 
possession of new provinces by the laws of war.’12 Vitoria here pointed to conquistador 
Cortés’ pact with the Nahua indios of Tlaxcala which, in his view, seemed to provide 
evidence for a Spanish actualization of Roman imperialism in the New World.13 
																																																								
10 The most sophisticated discussion of Vitoria’s use of the Roman imperial tradition is available in David A. 
Lupher, Romans in a New World: classical models in sixteenth-century Spanish America (Ann Arbor, MI, 
2003), pp. 68-82. 
11 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 3, a. 7, p. 289. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 3, a. 7, p. 289. See the discussion in Lupher, Romans in a 
New World, pp. 73-7. For insightful reflections on the contested contemporary conception of the pact’s afterlife 
in the context of the Tlaxalan subjection to Spanish suzerainty, see Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow, ‘Empires 
and protection: making interpolity law in the early modern world’, Journal of Global History, 12 (2017), pp. 74-
92, at p. 87. On the nexus between treaty-making and empire, see also Saliha Belmessous, ‘The paradox of an 
empire by treaty’, in Empire by treaty: negotiating european expansion, 1600-1900, ed. by Saliha Belmessous 
(Oxford, 2015), pp. 1-18. 
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In contrast, it has been pointed out that for Vitoria’s colleague Domingo de Soto, the 
ideology of Rome could not possibly provide a justificatory model for the conquest.14 In a 
central passage of his lecture De dominio (1535), Soto inquired ‘whether the emperor is lord 
of the whole world’15 and could for this reason legitimately claim authority over the newly 
discovered lands in the Americas. He conceded that the Romans had indeed dominated large 
parts of the Western world and passed on this historical jurisdiction to Charles V. But he also 
posited that ‘the Romans could not give to the emperor what they did not have themselves; 
but they never had imperium over the whole world and at no point in history made it to the 
antipodes or lands that are currently being discovered’.16 Unlike Vitoria, then, Soto pushed 
back against the idea that the Roman imperial tradition might in any way provide a legal 
foundation for Spanish empire overseas, and Charles V ultimately had ‘no right or dominion 
whatsoever over the lands of the unbelievers’17 by virtue of his title as Holy Roman Emperor. 
A second, further way in which the neo-scholastics turned to Rome, and which has 
likewise been recovered by intellectual historians, is how they appropriated arguments from 
Roman law in their appraisals of the Spanish conquest.18 Viewed through this lens, the 
Salmantine responses to Charles V’s venture overseas were fundamentally and unanimously 
critiques of empire. Vitoria and Soto, above all, resolutely repudiated the idea that the New 
World had been previously ‘unoccupied’ property and had thus been up for grabs for the 
Spaniards, as first takers.19 Extending the originally private Roman law sense of occupatio (as 
an individual’s rightful acquisition of a previously unowned thing) into the public domain, 
Vitoria and Soto insisted that the Amerindians had ‘occupied’ their lands long before the 																																																								
14 Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the world: ideologies of empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800 
(New Haven, CT, 1995), pp. 50-2; Richard Tuck, The rights of war and peace: political thought and the 
international order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford, 1999), pp. 73-5; Lupher, Romans in a New World, pp. 61-8 
and pp. 93-8; Annabel S. Brett, ‘Scholastic political thought and the modern concept of the state’, in Rethinking 
the foundations of modern political thought, ed. Annabel S. Brett and James Tully with Holly Hamilton-
Bleakley (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 144-5; Lauren Benton and Benjamin Straumann, ‘Acquiring empire by law: 
from Roman doctrine to early modern European practice’, Law and History Review, 28 (2010), pp. 1-38, at pp. 
23-5; Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, p. 46; and Anthony Pagden, The burdens of empire: 1539 
to the present (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 52-3. 
15 Domingo de Soto, De dominio, Latin ed. with parallel Spanish trans. by Jaime Brufau Prats, in: Domingo de 
Soto: relección “De Dominio”, ed. and trans. with an introduction by Jaime Brufau Prats (Granada, 1964), p. 
134: ‘Sequitur secundum dubium potissimum in hac nostra relectione: An videlicet Imperator sit dominus totius 
orbis.’ 
16 Ibid., p. 152: ‘Nam romani non potuerunt dare Imperatori nisi quod habebant; sed romani numquam 
habuerunt Imperium totius orbis, numquam enim memoriae traditum est pervenisse romanos ad antipodas vel ad 
has terras quae modo inveniuntur.’ 
17 Ibid., p. 158: ‘Ex his sequitur quod Imperator ad terras infidelium nullum ius habet nec dominium.’ 
18 For excellent discussions of this perspective, see Benton and Straumann, ‘Acquiring empire by law’, pp. 20-5; 
and Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, pp. 40-48. 
19 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 2, a. 3, pp. 264-5; Soto, De dominio, p. 162. 
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Spanish arrival and thus possessed legitimate jurisdiction, or sovereignty, over their 
territories. In this sense, the neo-scholastics exploited Roman law dicta on occupation that in 
their handling came to provide a barrier to any straightforward vindication of the Spanish 
overseas empire.  
Recent post-colonial studies, on the other hand, have forcefully stressed the 
entanglement of neo-scholastic theologians, especially Francisco de Vitoria’s, in the Spanish 
imperial and colonial venture overseas.20 The most influential case has been made by Antony 
Anghie, a legal scholar whose work has decisively shaped the ways in which we today 
conceptualize ‘the historical relationship between international law and the “Third World”’.21 
His approach is post-colonial in the sense that he seeks to expose how ‘the colonial origins of 
international law’22 have extended well beyond the age of colonialism – and he locates the 
earliest traces of this nexus between Western hegemony and law in Francisco de Vitoria’s 
lecture De indis. Anghie focuses on Vitoria’s use of the ius gentium or ‘law of nations’ and, 
in particular, on the implications of Vitoria’s insistence of a so-called right of free 
communication (ius communicandi). Although after the Fall from Eden, human beings set up 
distinct kingdoms and divided the formerly common lands on earth, Vitoria argued that 
certain things such as ‘running water and the open sea, rivers and ports are the common 
property of all’.23 Importantly, this right of inter-communication equally extended to trade 
relations, which effectively meant that everybody could licitly enter foreign commonwealths 
for commercial purposes. The Spaniards, Vitoria insisted, ‘may import the commodities 
which they lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which [the Amerindians] have in 
abundance’.24 It was illicit for native rulers to interfere with this freedom, in the same way 
that the king of France could neither prevent Castilian merchants from ‘travelling or even 
living in France, or vice versa, so long as it caused no sort of harm to themselves’.25 For 
Anghie, however, this juridical framework is only equal and reciprocal on the surface: 
‘Vitoria’s apparently innocuous enunciation of a right to “travel” and “sojourn” extends 																																																								
20 Robert A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in western legal thought: the discourses of conquest (Oxford, 
1990), ch. 2; China Miéville, Between equal rights: a Marxist theory of international law (Chicago, IL, 2006), 
ch. 5; and above all, Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law, ch. 1. 
21 Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law, p. 3. The movement of scholars 
engaged in the examination of this nexus is generally known as ‘Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL)’. See e.g. Bhupinder S. Chimni, ‘Third world approaches to international law: a manifesto’, 
International Community Law Review, 8 (2006), pp. 3-27. 
22 Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law, p. 3. 
23 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 3, a. 1, p. 279. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., p. 278. 
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finally to the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of norms which are 
inevitably violated by the Indians.’26 
Anghie’s focus on Vitoria’s theorization of the law of nations provides a stark contrast 
to the earlier Pagdenian focus on the natural constitution and abilities of human beings and 
reorients our attention towards an essentially legal perspective. But while this arguably also 
applies to the Roman lenses mentioned above, Anghie’s understanding of empire differs 
significantly from the conceptions that emerge from either ‘the ideology of Rome’ or 
‘occupation’. He insists that we miss what is at the heart of Vitoria’s thought if we simply 
focus on how he revived and redeployed classical legal doctrines. Quite the contrary, Anghie 
insists that Vitoria’s law of nations was ‘created out of the unique issues generated by the 
encounter between the Spanish and the Indians’.27 The result, for Anghie, is a novel and 
distinct articulation of empire that ‘finally endorses and legitimizes endless Spanish 
incursions into Indian society’28 and leads to an ‘endless process of creating a gap between 
two cultures, demarcating one as “universal” and civilized and the other as “particular” and 
uncivilized’.29 
While Anghie’s assessment might indeed seem plausible at first sight, it is in fact too 
forceful as it stands and does not fully do justice to the complexity of how either Vitoria or 
his colleagues at Salamanca understood and deployed the ius gentium. Vitoria’s construction 
of an image of ‘uncivilized’ American Indians does not always so clearly go hand in hand 
with a juridical articulation of Spanish domination. As Annabel Brett has shown, Vitoria’s 
insistence that ‘these barbarians are by nature cowardly, foolish, and ignorant’30 did not 
therefore give the Spaniards a blank cheque to wage war against American Indians.31 Quite 
the contrary, Vitoria argued that because Amerindians were ‘understandably fearful of men 
whose customs seem so strange ... the Spaniards must take care for their own safety, but do 
so with as little harm to the barbarians as possible since this is a merely defensive war’.32 
What is more, the neo-scholastics insisted that the rights granted to human beings by natural 																																																								
26 Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law, p. 21. 
27 Ibid., p. 15, emphasis mine. 
28 Ibid., p. 21. 
29 Ibid., 4. The same argument has recently been reiterated by José-Manuel Barreto, who closely follows 
Anghie’s line of argument. See Barreto, ‘Imperialism and decolonization as scenarios of human rights history’, 
in Human rights from a Third World perspective, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013), p. 
149. 
30 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 3, a. 1, p. 282. 
31 Annabel S. Brett, Changes of state: nature and the limits of the city in early modern natural law (Princeton, 
NJ, 2011), p. 15n19. Brett has also shown that the ius communicandi became equally relevant in a European 
context, granting mendicants the right to freely communicate between cities in the old world (ibid., pp. 34-5). 
32 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 3, a. 1, p. 282, emphasis mine. 
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law and by the ius gentium,33 although ultimately derived from God, did not depend on God’s 
grace. Instead, the Spanish scholastic theologians – including Vitoria34 – insisted that all 
human beings, by virtue of their humanity, not their Christianity or culture, possessed these 
rights.35 
The sweeping post-colonial critiques of the School of Salamanca’s universalist-
imperial complicity, then, risk overriding the categories that the Salmantine theologians 
themselves used.36 At the same time, however, it is important to point out that none of the 
Spanish scholastic theologians seriously challenged the legitimacy of the Spanish presence in 
the New World, as Martti Koskenniemi rightly insists.37 We should not therefore simply 
dismiss the readings by Anghie and others, but instead engage with the broader implications 
they entail. When it comes to Vitoria, some of the intellectual historians focusing on the 
discourse of imperium, most notably David Lupher, indeed emphasize that Vitoria can 
plausibly be interpreted as an ‘apologist for Spanish imperialism’.38 The problem, however, is 
that if we solely focus on Roman arguments we do end up with the conclusion that apart from 
Vitoria, the vast majority of the Spanish scholastic theologians, such as Domingo de Soto, 
Bartolomé Carranza de Miranda (1503-76), or Melchor Cano (1509-60) were critics of 
Spanish imperialism.39 
Instead of asking whether a given scholastic theologian was anti- or pro-imperial in a 
strictly Roman sense, I wish to adopt from recent post-colonial approaches to the School of 
Salamanca the awareness that empire is not solely articulated in and through traditional 
ideological and legal commonplaces. In other words, I concur that the question of how the 																																																								
33 The ius gentium served to mediate the demands of natural law into the concrete state of human political affairs 
after the Fall and was thus intimately bound up with the teleology of nature and God’s creation. See Annabel S. 
Brett, ‘Human rights and the Thomist tradition’, in Revisiting the origins of human rights, ed. Pamela Slotte and 
Miia Halme-Tuomisaari (Cambridge, 2015), p. 91. See also Brett, Changes of state, ch. 1. 
34 Vitoria, De indis, trans. Pagden and Lawrance, q. 1, conclusion, p. 250: ‘the barbarians undoubtedly possessed 
as true dominion, both public and private, as any Christians’. 
35 See Skinner, The foundations, II, pp. 67-9; Pagden, Fall of natural man, pp. 29-39; Anthony Pagden and 
Jeremy Lawrance, ‘Introduction’, in Vitoria: political writings, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy 
Lawrance (Cambridge, 1991), p. xvi; and Felix Hafner, Adrian Loretan, and Christoph Spenlé, ‘Naturrecht und 
Menschenrecht: Der Beitrag der Spanischen Spätscholastik zur Entwicklung der Menschenrechte’, in Die 
Ordnung der Praxis: Neue Studien zur Spanischen Spätscholastik, ed. Frank Grunert and Kurt Seelmann 
(Tübingen, 2001), p. 141. 
36 On this point, see also Ian Hunter, ‘Global justice and regional metaphysics: on the critical history of the law 
of nature and nations’, in Law and politics in British colonial thought: transformations of empire, ed. 
Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 11-29. For a counter-perspective, see Anne Orford, 
‘The past as law or history? The relevance of imperialism for modern international law’, International Law and 
Justice Working Papers, 2 (2012), pp. 1-17. 
37 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and international law: the real Spanish contribution’, University of Toronto Law 
Journal, 61 (2011), pp. 1-36, at p. 11. 
38 Lupher, Romans in a New World, p. 81. 
39 I shall engage with the paricular scholarly interpretations of these neo-scholastic theologians below. 
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Spanish theologians articulated hegemonic domination cannot be answered solely by looking 
for empire where we most readily expect to find it. Of course, this requires as a premise that 
we abandon an understanding of a strictly Roman notion of empire and, instead, conceive it 
more generally as the Spanish imposition of authority in the New World. However, I do not 
thereby intend to dismiss the crucial importance of the legal implications of empire.40 Instead, 
I wish to take into account neo-scholastic theorizations of empire and authority that are not 
necessarily Roman in origin, but which eventually lead to the same articulation of a legally 
binding power over the lands and peoples in America which ultimately granted the Spaniards 
the same as imperium, namely, in Theodor Mommsen’s words, ‘the right to demand 
obedience’.41 
The answer to this question – how they did it – is by no means straightforward. After 
all, the neo-scholastic theologians, as noted above, all insisted that natural rights42 did not 
depend on God’s grace, and they could not therefore easily justify Spanish authority over 
American Indians. However, I wish to show that shifting the focus to neo-scholastic 
theorizations of the right to preach the gospel, the ius praedicandi, allows us to conceive the 
engagement of Spanish scholastic theologians in the ‘affair of the Indies’ in a new light.43 
This alternative line of analysis does justice to the legalistic nature of neo-scholastic writings 
without reducing their venture to a discourse on Roman imperium. At the same time, it 
equally acknowledges the implications of recent post-colonial scholarship without glossing 
over the historical contingency of the language in which the scholastics were articulating 
their claims. Ultimately, the question this article seeks to address is how the ius praedicandi 																																																								
40 Although Rudolf Walther, in his article on Imperialismus in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, stresses that 
the notion of empire always also encompassed various non-legal significations. See Rudolf Walther, 
‘Imperialismus’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner et al. (8 vols., Stuttgart, 1972-97), III, p. 171: ‘“Imperium” war primär stets ein 
rechtlich mehr oder weniger genau bestimmter Begriff, dem daneben auch verschiedene nichtrechtliche 
Bedeutungen zukamen.’ 
41 Theodor Mommsen, Abriss des römischen Staatrechts, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1907), p. 91: ‘Das Imperium, das 
Recht Gehorsam zu fordern’. For an excellent history of the concept of imperium, see also J.S. Richardson, 
‘Imperium Romanum: empire and the language of power’, in Theories of empire, 1450-1800, ed. David 
Armitage (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 1-9. For a recent account on current historiographical debates about empire that 
comes with an extensive bibliography, see Sophus A. Reinert, ‘Wars and empires’, in A companion to 
intellectual history, ed. Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (Malden, MA, 2016), pp. 402-16. 
42 For the remainder of this article, I will not distinguish natural rights from rights granted by the ius gentium, 
for the point will always be to draw a contrast between the language of natural law, on the one hand, and the 
language of grace and the faith, on the other. 
43 Another alternative approach has recently been suggested by the legal scholar Martti Koskenniemi, who 
argues that the ‘real Spanish contribution’ was the neo-scholastics’ theorization of private rights that ultimately 
led to a form of inter-individual, commercial imperialism. A thorough engagement with Koskenniemi’s 
argument is, however, beyond the scope of this article, whose focus remains on public rights and jurisdiction. 
See Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and international law’, passim. 
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was creatively exploited by Spanish scholastic theologians in order to negotiate a largely 
neglected but fundamental interface between two discourses that are commonly regarded as 
distinct: the language of natural rights, on the one hand, as independent of God’s grace, and 
the hegemonic conception of the Christian faith and culture, on the other hand, as 
independent of any strictly legal consequences. Much of modern scholarship has rightly 
emphasized the neo-scholastic’s separation of questions of rights from questions of the faith. 
However, it is exactly the ius praedicandi where this separation breaks down. 
 
II 
The neo-scholastic discussions of the ius praedicandi are in important ways extensions of and 
commentaries on Aquinas’s reflections on preaching. In the Secunda secundae of his Summa 
theologiae, Aquinas addressed the question ‘whether unbelievers ought to be coerced into the 
faith’.44 He argued that although unbelievers ‘are in no way to be compelled into the faith ... 
they should be coerced by the faithful lest they hinder the faith’.45 Moreover, Aquinas also 
claimed that even though unbelievers had rightful authority over their territories, their ‘right 
of dominion or authority can be justly abolished by the sentence or ordinance of the 
Church’.46 The matter became more complicated, however, when addressing the situation of 
so-called non-apostate infidels, that is, unbelievers who were not and had never been subject 
to Christian domination47 – a categorization of unbelievers that only became possible in the 
context of the ‘discovery’ of the New World and which was first articulated by Tommaso de 
Vio Cajetan (1468-1534). 48  In his lecture course on Aquinas’s Secunda secundae at 
Salamanca in 1534-5, Vitoria endorsed Aquinas’s position insofar as he agreed that 
‘Christian princes have the authority to compel their subjects to believe’.49 When it came to 
non-apostate unbelievers, on the other hand, Vitoria argued that this did not apply, ‘because 
the king of Spain has no greater power over them than I do over my fellow citizens; but I 
cannot compel a fellow citizen to hear mass, ergo’.50 																																																								
44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a2ae, q. 10, a. 8, p. 268. I am using the following translation: Thomas 
Aquinas, Aquinas: political writings, ed. and trans. Robert W. Dyson (Cambridge, 2002). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., a. 10, p. 271. 
47 Note that the neo-scholastic critique of Roman imperium is equally based on this issue, for the New World 
lies outside the traditional realm of the Christian-Roman world. 
48 Hafner, Loretan, and Spenlé, ‘Naturrecht und Menschenrecht’, pp. 130-1. 
49 Francisco de Vitoria, Lectio reportata in ST II-II 10.8, ed. and trans. as ‘Lecture on the evangelization of 
unbelievers’, in Vitoria: political writings, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge, 
1991), p. 344. 
50 Ibid., p. 346. 
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In his 1539 lecture on the American Indians, Vitoria famously rejected the legal force 
of the bulls that Pope Alexander VII had issued for the Catholic Monarchs. ‘The pope has no 
temporal power over these barbarians’51 and his donation provided ‘no right at all to occupy 
their countries’52 in Vitoria’s view. Crucially, however, this did not mean that the remainder 
of De indis solely centred on ‘secular’ issues, and that questions of religion and the faith were 
off the table.53 Vitoria also reiterated Aquinas’s dictum that ‘Christians have the right to 
preach and announce the Gospel’54 and ‘if the barbarians ... obstruct the Spaniards in their 
free propagation of the Gospel, the Spaniards, after first reasoning with them to remove any 
cause of provocation, may preach and work for the conversion of that people even against 
their will, and may if necessary take up arms and declare war on them’.55 This clearly shows 
that notwithstanding his weakening of the papal donation, and despite his initial denial of the 
possibility to forcibly convert American Indians, Vitoria conceived the ius praedicandi as a 
fundamental right whose prevention gave rise to the purely natural right of waging war to the 
Spaniards.56 It would therefore be misleading to suggest that ‘for Vitoria ... there was no 
justification for the conquest’,57 as Andrew Fitzmaurice has claimed. But it also seems 
strange to view Vitoria’s ‘questioning of the jurisdiction of the papacy’ as his principal 
achievement, and to conclude from this that his intervention led to ‘a significant shift in the 
theory of legitimate imperialism, weakening the simple connection between the spread of the 
Gospel and a supposed right to conquer’,58 as Joan-Pau Rubiés has recently argued. Quite the 
contrary, the ius praedicandi provided a powerful way of translating Vitoria’s insistence on 
the absolute truth of Christianity into the language of natural law. 
It is to the merit of scholars such as Richard Tuck and David Lupher that the 
ubiquitous and sole focus on Vitoria’s De indis has recently been complemented by a 
recovery of the perspective that Domingo de Soto, Vitoria’s pupil and later colleague at 
Salamanca, presented in his immediate response to the ‘affair of the Indies’ in his 1535 																																																								
51 Vitoria, De indis, q. 2, a. 2, p. 262, original emphasis. 
52 Ibid., p. 264. 
53 Vitoria remained ambiguous as to whether there was a connection between papal power and the right to 
preach, whereas Domingo de Soto established an intimate connection between the two, as we shall see below. 
54 Ibid., q. 3, a. 2, p. 284, original emphasis. 
55 Ibid., p. 285, original emphasis. 
56 See also Daniel Deckers, Gerechtigkeit und Recht: Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung der 
Gerechtigkeitslehre des Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) (Freiburg i. B., 1991), pp. 239-40.  
57 Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, pp. 48-9. 
58 Joan-Pau Rubiés, ‘The discovery of new worlds in sixteenth-century philosophy’, in The Routledge 
companion to sixteenth-century philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 
2017), p. 72. For a similar argument, see also James Muldoon, Popes, lawyers, and infidels: the church and the 
non-Christian world, 1250-1550 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 148-50. 
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lecture De dominio.59 Both Tuck and Lupher draw attention to Soto’s insistence ‘that the 
emperor in no way has dominium of all the world’.60 However, it is less clear that Soto 
therefore also rejected an enforceable ius praedicandi. In the final and central passage of De 
dominio, Soto stated that 
 
in the Gospel, we find: Go preach the Gospel to all creatures (Mark 16); where the 
right to preach the Gospel (ius praedicandi) all over the world is granted to us, and as 
a consequence, we are given the right to defend ourselves against whomever that 
impedes our preaching. ... But I have not said this in order to condemn everything that 
has been done [by the Spaniards] among these Caribbean Indians, for the judgements 
of God are unfathomable, and God perhaps wants to convert so many peoples in a 
way unknown to us.61 
 
Rather than comprising ‘a bold challenge to the legitimacy of Spanish dominion in the 
Indies’,62 as David Lupher has characterized Soto’s lecture, an attention to the final words in 
De dominio leaves the reader with a conclusion that is far from straightforward. Indeed, Soto 
emphasized that he did not know ‘by what right we retain the ultramarine empire that has 
recently been discovered’. 63  However, he equally insisted on the validity of the ius 
praedicandi as a right that could be defended, and he was very explicit that he did not 
condemn the Spaniards’ presence and all their deeds in the New World. Soto did not 
therefore ‘reject the possibility of conquest’ and he neither argued that ‘the attack on 
preachers seen in the Amerindian case cannot be a legitimate cause for conquering peoples’,64 
as the theologian David Lantigua forcefully claims. Rather, in De dominio, Soto remained 
ambiguous as to whether the ius praedicandi was indeed the right which could have provided 																																																								
59 It must be noted, however, that in Spanish scholarship Soto’s De dominio was received and discussed already 
in the early 1960. See especially Jaime Brufau Prats’ El pensamiento político de Domingo de Soto y su 
concepción del poder (Salamanca, 1960); and also his Domingo de Soto: relección “De Dominio” (Granada, 
1964), in which the Latin text with parallel Spanish translation of Soto’s lecture is edited. 
60 Soto, De dominio, p. 162: ‘quod Imperator nulla via habet Imperium in toto orbe’. For references to Tuck and 
Lupher, see above at footnote 14. 
61 Soto, De dominio, p. 162: ‘In Evangelio habemus: Ite praedicate Evangelium omni creaturae, Mc. 16; ubi 
datum est nobis ius praedicandi ubique terrarum et, ex consequenti, datum est nobis ius defendendi nos a 
quibuscumque nos impedirent a praedicatione. ... Nec ista dixerim ad condemnandum omnia quae fiunt apud 
istos insulares; nam iudicia Dei abyssus multa, et Deus forsam vult tot gentes via nobis ignota ad se convertere.’ 
62 Lupher, Romans in a New World, p. 62. 
63 Soto, De dominio, p. 162: ‘Quo ergo iure retinemus Imperium quod modo reperitur ultramarinum? Re vera 
ego nescio.’ 
64 David Lantigua, ‘The freedom of the gospel: Aquinas, subversive natural law, and the Spanish Wars of 
religion’, Modern Theology, 31 (2015), pp. 312-37, at p. 330. 
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a legitimation of Spanish authority over American Indians, and it is only in a much later text 
that he came to take a more comprehensively articulated stance. But before considering 
Soto’s later writing, let us first turn to Bartolomé Carranza de Miranda, who addressed the 
implications of the ius praedicandi in his lecture course on Aquinas’s Summa in 1540. 
 Although Carranza was never himself actively involved in the University of 
Salamanca, he had strong ties to various theologians at Salamanca, commented on the same 
passages of Aquinas, and relied on the same sources as his colleagues. He attended Vitoria’s 
early lectures at the Dominican Colegio de San Gregorio in Valladolid around the mid-1520s, 
became a close friend of Domingo de Soto’s, and assumed the prime chair in theology at 
Valladolid in 1536.65 A major reason why Carranza nevertheless remains largely absent from 
scholarly discussions of neo-scholastic thought is that his lectures on the Summa were never 
turned into a publication and exist only in manuscript, with the exception of the edition of his 
commentary on question 10 of the Secunda secundae.66 And it is exactly in this section that 
Carranza addressed the implications of the ius praedicandi in the context of the New World. 
 Carranza first asserted that American Indians were true masters of their own affairs 
and could not therefore, on behalf of their unbelief, be subjected either by the emperor or by 
the pope.67 He thereby not only followed Soto in unambiguously rejecting the Roman 
imperial title, but he equally reiterated the authentically neo-Thomist separation of rights 
from grace. With regard to the ius praedicandi, Carranza went on to argue that  
 
the prince of the infidels cannot be compelled to listen to the faith ... if the entire 
commonwealth agreed that they do not want to hear about another faith or any laws 
																																																								
65 General biographical information on Carranza is from Schmutz’s entry on Carranza on Scholasticon; and 
from Pereña’s Misión de España in América, pp. 27-31. For Vitoria and Carranza, see Lupher, Romans in a New 
World, p. 40; and Pereña, Misión de España en América, 31. For Soto and Carranza, see Belda Plans, La 
escuela de Salamanca, p. 543. 
66 Carranza’s commentary on q. 10 of the 2a2ae is edited, with parallel Spanish translation, as Ratione fidei 
potest Caesar debellare et tenere Indos novi orbis? in Misión de España en América: 1540-1560, by Luciano 
Pereña (Madrid, 1956), pp. 38-57. As Pereña states in the first footnote to the edited text, this section is a part of 
a manuscript in the Vatican library that is entitled Annotationes in 2am 2ae D. Thomae. Carranza is also the 
author of Summa conciliorum et pontificum Petro usque ad Paulum tertium (Salamanca 1551); and 
Comentarios sobre el catechismo Christiano (Antwerp 1558). The only scholar who has recently included a 
brief discussion of Carranza’s text, as edited by Pereña, is Lupher in Romans in a New World, pp. 82-5. 
67 Carranza, Ratione fidei, p. 40. Carranza’s rejection of the Roman title is also pointed out in Lupher, Romans 
in a New World, p. 85. 
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other than those that they have, they cannot be compelled to that, because they have 
their own laws and do not want others.68 
 
Carranza here vehemently denied that the ius praedicandi could be enforced in infidel 
territories over which no Christian prince had any authority. Rather than emphasizing the 
right to the free propagation of the faith, he stressed, in contrast both to Vitoria and to Soto’s 
early writing, that unbelievers could not even be compelled to listen to preaching.69 
Moreover, it is remarkable that Carranza openly conceded that his view clashed with the 
teaching of Aquinas. Rather than deploying the characteristically neo-scholastic strategy of 
re-interpreting the Summa in a way of positioning one’s own stance as a compatible 
extension of the views of Aquinas, Carranza drew attention to the fact that ‘the contrary is 
argued by Saint Thomas’.70 As a consequence, he thus insisted that ‘if they are infidels who 
never accepted the faith, about whom we can say that if there was no right to take them up 
and subject them, then there was no right to retain them’.71 Read in the context of the ‘affair 
of the Indies’, this seems to be an open refutation of any justifications of the Spanish 
presence in the New World via the ius praedicandi. 
As David Lupher rightly observes, ‘Carranza also offered a striking extension of 
Soto’s and Vitoria’s insistence that the Indians had a right to dominion over their own goods 
and polities’.72 And indeed, Carranza argued that 
 
if the Christians are plundered and taken captive by the infidels by just title and if they 
allow them to dwell with the infidels themselves, as subjects, without an injustice 
against their faith, in that case the church cannot grant a law which would take away 
their power and dominium.73 
 																																																								
68 Carranza, Ratione fidei, pp. 40-2: ‘princeps infidelis non potest compelli ad audiendam fidem ... si tota 
respublica conveniret ut nollint audire aliam fidem, nec alias leges ab illis quas habent, isto non potest compelli, 
quia ipsi habent suas leges et nollunt alias.’ 
69 This is, even with regard to the ‘Indian question’ more broadly speaking, contra Pagden, Fall of natural man, 
p. 107: ‘his [i.e., Carranza’s] conclusion was the same as Vitoria’s’. 
70 Carranza, Ratione fidei, p. 42, emphasis mine: ‘Contrarium autem divus Thomas intelligit ... possunt principes 
infidelium ad hoc compelli ut admitant praedicatores.’ 
71 Ibid.: ‘si sunt infideles qui nunquam susceperunt fidem, de illis dicendum est quod si non habuerunt ius ad eos 
suscipiendos, nec habent ad detinendos illos’. 
72 Lupher, Romans in a New World, p. 85. 
73 Carranza, Ratione fidei, p. 47: ‘si christiani justo titulo expolientur ab infidelibus et capiantur ab infidelibus et 
permittunt habitare sine iniuria suae fidei etiam subditi cum ipsis infidelibus, in tali casu ecclesia non potest 
concedere legem quae illos eximat ab eorum potestate et dominio’. 
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Unbelievers, in Carranza’s view, had the same rights as Christians and could therefore indeed 
justly wage a war against Christians if they had a just cause. At the same time, however, 
Carranza strongly emphasized the importance of the integrity of the Christian faith. 
Amerindians could only make use of their just title if they did not thereby hinder the 
Christian faith, and this testifies to an ambiguous convergence between rights and the faith 
insofar as a violation of the latter voided the former. 
Most importantly, however – and this is entirely ignored by Lupher – Carranza 
sidestepped the issue of the injustice involved in Spain’s ‘acquisition’ of authority over 
American Indians. Although they had ‘unjustly’ accepted the faith, ‘the pope must care for 
those, or even more, he must entrust this care to a Catholic prince, so that these 
[Amerindians] do not return into unbelief’.74 Consequently, he insisted that ‘muchos indios’75 
had already become members of the Christian church and, irrespective of the circumstances 
of their integration, the effect was that this gave the pope an obligation to ‘care’ for the 
American Indians. According to the neo-scholastic logic, apostates will suffer from eternal 
damnation and must therefore be saved, and Carranza’s point about the pope’s ‘care’ thus has 
to be conceived as serious, theological reasoning. At the same time, however, Carranza 
avoided engaging the question whether the fact that conversion had not gone about peacefully 
and not by the free will of the neophytes problematized the situation in any way. Instead, he 
remained silent about whether the ius praedicandi could have justified the conquest in the 
first place and thereby avoided any further conflation of nature and grace. Carranza was far 
from challenging the de facto state of Spanish authority over the New World, but his elusive 
stance testifies to the uneasy position of the ius praedicandi and the Christian faith within a 
system of natural rights that was otherwise clearly independent of Christianity. In order to 
understand the underlying force of Carranza’s argument, we now turn to Melchor Cano, who 
understood the ius praedicandi in the same terms but, unlike Carranza, further articulated its 
implications.76 
 Shortly before moving to Salamanca to succeed his former master Francisco de 
Vitoria as prime chair in theology, Melchor Cano addressed the question of the justice of 																																																								
74 Ibid., p. 42: ‘Alii sunt infideles qui susceperunt fidem, licet iniuste como muchos indios, de his dicendum est, 
quod Pontifex debet habere curam, imo debet committere principi christiano qui curet ne illi redeant ad 
vomitum’. 
75 See the quote in the previous footnote. 
76 The point is that both were speaking the very same language or discourse. On the relationship between author 
and discourse, see Quentin Skinner, ‘Interpretation and the understanding of speech acts’, in Visions of politics 
(3 vols., Cambridge, 2002), I, pp. 117-8. 
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Spanish authority in the New World in one of his final lectures delivered at the University of 
Alcalá in 1546.77 In De dominio indorum Cano insisted, like Carranza before him, that if 
unbelievers impeded the Christians’ preaching of the faith, they could not therefore be 
compelled to listen.78 Importantly, Cano at the same time emphasized that this was only so if 
all unbelievers stood united in their opposition to preaching. Yet, he went on, ‘because it is 
likely that some of these people want to listen and are prevented by tyrants, it is licit to attack 
by war. Not by reason of the gospel, but in order to defend the innocent’.79 In arguing that 
there would always be people who did give ear to preaching, Cano made explicit that the 
ultimate justification of the Spanish presence was not based on grace, but framed by the 
language of natural rights. However, he did not thereby diminish the power of the ius 
praedicandi. On the contrary, it was the very right to preach the Gospel whose prevention 
gave rise to the right to defend the innocent.  
While Carranza had only discussed the consequence of the particular situation ‘if the 
entire commonwealth agreed that they do not want to hear about another faith’,80 as we have 
seen, Cano emphasized that this was merely a theoretical assertion which was never actually 
likely to take place and which could not therefore be an appropriate description of the 
situation in the New World. In contrast to Carranza’s elusiveness about the role the ius 
praedicandi played in theorizing Spanish authority over American Indians, Cano pondered 
on its further implications. He thus established a crucial link between the ius praedicandi and 
what ultimately turned out to be the right to wage a war (ius belli), thereby deploying a fully-
fledged theoretical legitimation of the Spanish conquest of the New World.81 What Cano was 
actually doing can therefore hardly be characterized as ‘not the reaping of opportunities 
offered by traditional ius belli’ and, instead, championing ‘the liberation of the oppressed 
from the shackles of tyrannical enemies’,82 as David Lupher insists. 																																																								
77 Lupher, Romans in a New World, p. 85. Cano’s opus magnum is his De locis theologicis (Salamanca 1563), 
which went through 30 editions until the end of the nineteenth century (see Schmutz’s entry on Cano on 
Scholasticon; and for the wider context of the De locis theologicis see Plans, La escuela de Salamanca, pp. 549-
72.) 
78 Melchor Cano, De dominio indorum, Latin ed. with parallel Spanish trans. by Luciano Pereña, in Misión de 
España en América: 1540-1560, by Luciano Pereña (Madrid, 1956), a. 14, p. 142. 
79 Ibid., emphasis mine: ‘quia verisimile est aliquos e populo velle audire et impediuntur a tyrannis, licet bello 
petere, non ratione evangelii, sed in defensionem innocentium’. 
80 See above at footnote 68. 
81 The very same argument was later also deployed by Pedro de Sotomayor, Soto’s successor as prime chair of 
theology at Salamanca, in his lecture course on Aquinas’s Summa in 1556-7. See Pedro de Sotomayor, An sola 
causa augendi religionem et fidem liceat contra infideles bellare qui non possident terras nostras nec intulerunt 
nobis aliquid malum, in De bello contra insulanos: intervención de España en América: escuela española de la 
paz, segunda generación 1560-1585, by Juan de la Peña, ed. Luciano Pereña et al. (Madrid, 1982), p. 182. 
82 Lupher, Romans in a New World, p. 85. 
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III 
Let us now return to Domingo de Soto, and explore his engagement with the ius praedicandi 
in two of his later writings. De dominio, as we know, does not provide a comprehensive 
answer as to how Soto situated the ius praedicandi in his response to the ‘affair of the 
Indies’. In one of his later relectiones, a lecture delivered at the University of Salamanca in 
1554, Soto addressed the matter anew, raising the question whether infidel commonwealths 
could be justly conquered on the grounds of their idolatry.83 Although only a fragment of it 
has survived, it is a noteworthy text insofar as Soto here took a position that differed 
strikingly from his earlier argument in De dominio. His main thrust was ‘to show that solely 
on account of their infidelity, the Christians do not have the right to wage war against the 
infidels, and this is because we do not have such a power ... the Catholic faith has not given 
us any power to punish them’.84 Soto here suggested a clear cut separation of matters of the 
faith from temporal power and the language of natural law.85 But Soto also no longer referred 
to the right to preach the gospel, and he thereby avoided addressing the problematic status of 
the ius praedicandi, and how it might or might not be enforced if Christian preaching was to 
be faced with opposition. 
But this is not the end of the story. It was in his final great work, a commentary on the 
fourth book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, first published in two volumes between 1558-60, 
in which Soto finally came to address the matter more comprehensively.86 This text remains 
largely absent from any modern scholarly discussion of Soto’s political thought,87 which may 
be due to the fact that In quartum sententiarum commentarii was de jure a commentary on 
the Sentences. A closer look at the text itself, however, makes clear that Soto in fact turned it 
into a commentary on Aquinas’s Summa, and he did this by an ‘integration of the articles of 
																																																								
83 The Latin text is edited as An liceat civitates infidelium seu gentilium expugnare ob idolatriam, in De bello 
contra insulanos: intervención de España en América: escuela española de la paz, segunda generación 1560-
1585, by Juan de la Peña, ed. Luciano Pereña et al. (Madrid, 1982), pp. 586-92.  
84 Soto, An liceat civitates, p. 587: ‘monstratum est ob solam idolatriam non esse christianis fas infideles 
debellare, ea scilicet de causa quod talem potestatem non habemus ... fides catholica nullam nobis tradidit 
potestatem eadem puniendi’. 
85 Ibid., p. 592: ‘Quare non video cur nobis facultatem faciat illos armis reprimendi.’ In this sense, it is not quite 
correct to simply say that Soto ‘remained’ skeptical, as Richard Tuck argues. See Tuck, Rights of war and 
peace, p. 75. 
86 For reasons of availability, I am quoting from the edition that was printed in Salamanca in 1569: Domingo de 
Soto, In quartum sententiarum commentarii (2 vols., Salamanca, 1569). 
87 The major exceptions are Jaime Brufau Prats, La escuela de Salamana, pp. 114-17; and Joseph Höffner, 
Kolonialismus und Evangelium: Spanische Kolonialethik im Goldenen Zeitalter, 2nd rev. ed. (Tier, 1969), pp. 
327-41. 
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the Summa into the distinctions of the Sentences’.88 This strategy of Soto’s also becomes 
apparent when considering the section in which he, again, addressed the issue of forcible 
conversion and in which he finally came to revisit the status of the ius praedicandi.89 
 At the outset of the discussion, Soto reiterated his insistence on the validity of the ius 
praedicandi, framing it with two fundamental premises: First, ‘by the law of nature, anybody 
has the liberty and right to instruct others and to persuade them of [the Gospel]’.90 In contrast 
to the relectio An liceat civitates, Soto brought the ius praedicandi back into play and, for the 
first time, also clearly insisted that it was a right framed by natural law. We shall return to 
this point shortly. Secondly, Soto continued, ‘if anybody hinders and prevents us from this 
preaching, we have the right to ward off his violence ... However, we cannot compel those 
who do not want to listen to us’.91 Soto here took up his earlier point made in De dominio, 
insisting that the ius praedicandi could be enforced insofar as it could be defended.92 Yet, his 
subsequent argument that unbelievers could not therefore be forced to listen to Christian 
preaching raises the question whether Soto followed Cano’s solution – that there would 
always be those who want to listen; ultimately an argument about the defence of the innocent 
– thus reconciling this qualification with a conception of the ius praedicandi as enforceable 
right. 
In order to try to answer these issues, let us first turn to a key passage in which Soto 
addressed the concrete case of the role of the ius praedicandi in the New World: 
 
Alexander VI, by his donation to our Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, 
conceded the expedition to the Occidental Islands of the infidels. But to this I reply, 
especially, that the pope did not concede ... and indeed could not have conceded 
dominium to them.93 																																																								
88 Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste, ‘The Sentences in sixteenth-century Iberian scholasticism’, in Medieval 
commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (3 vols., Leiden, 2001-15), III, p. 
452. Although Soto had indeed written a more straightforward commentary on the Summa, he did not address q. 
10 of the 2a2ae in his famous De iustitia et iure (Salamanca 1553/6). 
89 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 265, col. 1. 
90 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 266, col. 2: ‘Iure naturae unusquilibet 
libertatem habet et facultatem docendi alios, eisque persuadendi illa [i.e., the Gospel].’ I am translating facultas 
as ‘right’ because, like ius, it was conceived by Soto as ‘licit ability’ or ‘licit subjective power’ (see Brett, 
Liberty, right and nature, p. 150). 
91 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol 267, col. 1: ‘Si quis eandem praedicationem 
nobis impediret et cohiberet, iure possemus eius violentiam, etiam armis, propulsare ... Illos autem, qui nos 
audire nolent, compellere ut nos audirent, non possemus.’ 
92 See above at footnote 61. 
93 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 272, col. 1: ‘Quintum argumentum in 
contrarium afferri potest, quod Alexander sextus suo diplomate catholicis regibus nostris Ferdinando et 
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Soto here reiterated his earlier position and, indeed, the authentically neo-scholastic view that 
the papal donation to the Reyes Católicos in 1493 did not grant them any temporal power 
over the New World, because the pope himself did not have this kind of potestas in the first 
place.94 At the same time, however, he went on to argue that  
 
the pope indeed executes that power over the whole world, which is the promulgation 
of the faith, and these regions and lands are in his power in order to distribute this 
office. And therefore, he granted them to the Spanish Kings, so that these send learned 
and honest men, who teach this very faith.95 
 
Interestingly, although Soto had initially argued that everybody had the right to preach the 
gospel by natural law, he now insisted that this was a particular power of the pope – a power 
not only over Christian territories, but equally over the lands of the non-apostate infidels in 
the New World. In his commentary on the Sentences, Soto thus framed the ius praedicandi 
both as a natural right and as a papal power, which testifies to its uneasy position between 
rights that are natural and thus apply to anyone, and matters of the faith, which only apply to 
Christians and do not have an effect over temporal matters. The ius praedicandi thus blurs 
the categories of natural/Christian and temporal/spiritual, respectively, and cannot be 
unambiguously situated either within one or the other. 
It is undoubtedly true that Soto was far from openly advocating Spanish dominion in 
the New World on the grounds of the ius praedicandi and problematized forcible conversion 
in his commentary on the Sentences.96 Soto insisted that the Spaniards could only have 
obtained a right over American Indians ‘if by their own will they converted to Christianity 
and chose the same kings’ or ‘if they did not persist in the faith, which they had accepted’.97 
And like all the Dominican neo-scholastics, he was indeed wary of granting the pope too 
much power and opposed a hierocratic papalism. A counter-example might be Alonso de la 																																																																																																																																																																												
Elisabeth [sic!] expeditionem in Insulas Occidentales infidelium concessit. Ad hoc autem respondetur in primis 
pontificem neque concessisse, imo vero neque ... concedere potuisse dominium eorum.’ 
94 The same had already been argued by Vitoria, as noted above in Section 2. 
95 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 272, col. 1: ‘Enimvero cum summus 
pontifex hac in universum orbem potestas fungatur, quae est fidem promulgare, illi competit regiones plagasque 
ad hoc munus distribuere. Et ideo concessit Hispaniarum regibus, ut illuc mitterent viros doctos et probos, qui 
eandem docerent fidem.’ 
96 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 270, col. 1. 
97 Ibid., fol. 272, col. 1: ‘si dum sua se sponte in Christianismum manciparent eosdem sibi reges eligerent … 
Deinde si in fide, quam susceperant non persisterent, possent tunc subiugari’. 
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Vera Cruz (1507-84), who after his studies and a short-term position at Salamanca joined the 
Augustinian mission, and became professor of theology at the newly established University 
of Mexico in 1553.98 On the one hand, Vera Cruz agreed with the scholastics in Spain that 
‘the sovereign pontiff is under obligation ... to send missionaries to the unlettered and 
primitive peoples recently discovered, inasmuch as they were the sheep of Christ according 
to the eternal predestination, and he must bring them in’.99 But he went further than that. 
Whereas the members of the School of Salamanca unanimously insisted that papal potestas 
did not extend to direct temporal claims over the natives in the New World, Vera Cruz 
insisted that ‘if necessary’, the pope had ‘authority and dominion over all things temporal’.100 
Ultimately, he explained, this meant that if the pontiff ‘could not perform his duty because of 
some obstacle placed by some king or temporal ruler, he might dispose of such a king and of 
his kingdom and power, either by depriving him of it, or by punishing him or by waging war 
against him to the extent necessary to remove the obstacle’.101 
Domingo de Soto, in contrast, refrained from openly arguing that the pope possessed 
the power to depose princes in the New World, even if Christian preaching was hindered. 
Moreover, he also opposed the Vitorian view of enforcing the ius praedicandi against the 
unbelievers’ will, and he likewise avoided overtly advocating the underlying link between the 
ius praedicandi and the right to wage war, as Cano had done. However, in accepting the 
validity of the ius praedicandi, he could not avoid the fundamental ambiguity that was at the 
heart of the right to preach the gospel, the very fact that it negotiated both the language of 
grace and the language of natural law. Although nobody could be forced to listen, the 
American Indians could neither hinder Spanish preaching without violating the ius 
praedicandi, whose prevention gave rise to the purely ‘secular’ right to enforce preaching 
and ward off any resistance to it.102 In this sense, the ius praedicandi served to protect and 
sustain an enduring state of Christian preaching, up to the moment of the Amerindians’ 
conversion. And after their incorporation into the church, the Spaniards would finally have 
rightful authority over the peoples in the New World. 																																																								
98 On the biographical and intellectual context of Vera Cruz, see Schmutz’s entry on Scholasticon; and Ernest J. 
Burrus, ‘Introduction’, in The writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz, ed. Ernest J. Burrus (5 vols., Rome, 1967-76), 
II, pp. 7-14. On Vera Cruz’ engagement with the Roman imperial title, see Lupher, Romans in a New World, pp. 
161-7. 
99 Alonso de la Vera Cruz, Reddite Caesaris Caesari et quae Dei sunt Deo, trans. Ernest J. Burrus as Defense of 
the Indians: their rights, in The writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz, ed. Ernest J. Burrus (5 vols., Rome, 1967-
76), II, p. 313. 
100 Vera Cruz, Reddite Caesaris Caesari, trans. Burrus, II, p. 313. 
101 Ibid., p. 315. 
102 Soto, In quartum sententiarum, vol. 1, dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10, fol. 272, col. 1. 
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IV 
Advocates of empire or critics, who unmasked the faulty foundation of Castilian domination 
in the Americas? Charles V reprimanded the neo-scholastics for their inquiries into the 
legitimacy of the conquest, as we have seen, and not everything the Spanish theologians said 
seems quite in line with the voice and venture of the emperor. This is especially so if we 
focus on classical Roman arguments. Much recent work in intellectual history has highlighted 
those neo-scholastic topoi, which cast doubt on the School of Salamanca’s imperial 
complicity. Yet the fact that the neo-scholastics opposed traditional arguments for empire 
was not the end of their story, and it should neither be the end of ours. Post-colonial readings 
of the Thomist responses to the ‘affair of the Indies’, though often deemed and doomed as 
anachronistic, have suggestively underlined the importance of looking for empire where we 
might not anticipate it at first sight. In shifting the focus toward the right to preach the gospel, 
this article has tried to make a case for the importance of this latter notion, without 
abandoning the conviction that historical discourses must be understood in the terms that past 
thinkers themselves were using. 
To be sure, appeals to the nexus of preaching and empire were not limited to the 
political thought of the Spanish scholastics. At the end of the sixteenth century, for instance, 
the Italian intellectual Giovanni Botero emphasized the importance of religious instruction in 
the New World by relating the situation in Spanish America to the historically intimate 
relationship between the Roman empire and the Catholic church.103  ‘The greatness of 
empire’, Botero wrote, ‘signifies much for the preaching of the gospel of peace, for to empire 
alone is peace conjoined.’104 While Botero did not speak of a right of preaching in the way 
that the Spanish theologians did, in his thought Christian mission was ultimately ‘a function 
of empire’,105 too. The neo-scholastic theorizations of the ius praedicandi thus constitute a 
distinct episode within a broader history of early modern reflections on the entanglement of 
European power overseas and the Catholic church. 
What is more, to some extent, the ius praedicandi negotiates Spanish authority in the 
New World in a way that is analogous to the more well-known right of free communication 
(ius communicandi). Missionaries as well as merchants had a right to enter Amerindian 
commonwealths, and in both cases a refusal of letting them pass would amount to a just 																																																								
103 I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing me to Botero. 
104 Giovanni Botero, Relationi universali (Venice 1622), part 4, bk. 2, p. 12, trans. in John M. Headley, 
‘Geography and empire in the late Renaissance: Botero's assignment, western universalism, and the civilizing 
process’, Renaissance Quarterly, 53.4 (2000), pp. 1119-55, at p. 1137. 
105 Headley, ‘Geography and empire’, p. 1137. 
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Spanish war. But while both of these legal mechanisms can be said to belong to a broader 
arsenal of more or less straightforwardly imperial legal commonplaces, the argument of this 
article is that the ius praedicandi is unique insofar as it is qualitatively different from 
alternative arguments for empire. In many ways, the Spanish theologians sought to make 
sense of the issues involved in the New World by relating them to familiar examples from a 
European setting. Vitoria, as we have seen, asserted that the Spaniards had a right to travel to 
the Indies in the same way that they could justly penetrate the kingdom of France. This 
articulation of juridical arguments in a set of diverse contexts that often cut across the 
Atlantic – something Annabel Brett has called ‘the Dominican habit of “cross-
referencing”’106 – is a well-known and indeed crucial hermeneutic strategy of the Salmantine 
theologians. The ius praedicandi, however, embodied an oddly regional element that 
militated against the very universality of natural law of which it was also a constitutive part. 
It became a specifically pressing issue for the Spanish scholastics because the peoples in the 
New World were non-apostate unbelievers, who had never been subject to Christian-Roman 
princes. The discussion about the enforceability of the right to preach the gospel, therefore, 
could not be domesticated and was clearly set in an exclusively overseas context.107 It is in 
this sense that the ius praedicandi also constitutes an expressly imperial locus. 
In its sliding between natura and gratia this right is equally suggestive and indicative 
of the underappreciated complexity of Spanish scholastic thought. The reluctant, cautious, 
and at times elusive ways of addressing the ius praedicandi testify to the fact that the neo-
scholastic theologians, and most significantly Domingo de Soto, were well aware that it did 
not sit easily with the idea of natural rights. It provided an ambiguous interface, a grey area 
between nature and the faith, and between temporal and spiritual power. The ius praedicandi 
thus served to translate the neo-scholastics’ deeply rooted belief in the hegemonic truth of the 
Christian faith into a discourse of otherwise ‘secular’ rights and therefore provided a 
normative justification for spreading Christianity. In the context of the ‘affair of the Indies’, 
however, its ultimate effect was to pave a direct way for establishing Spanish empire, the 
right to demand obedience, in the New World. 
 
																																																								
106 Brett, ‘Scholastic political thought’, p. 145. See also Brett, Changes of state, ch. 1. 
107 I do not therefore agree with Anthony Pagden that in Vitoria’s logic, ‘this would mean that Indian 
missionaries – should such persons have existed – or far more contentiously Muslim ones, should have been 
allowed a similar access to Spain’ (Burdens of empire, p. 65). In the scholastic understanding, the ius 
praedicandi was not about preaching any religion, but uniquely about spreading the Christian faith. 
